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Abstract
Recent studies suggest that the type of strategic environment or expectation feed-
back can have a large impact on whether the market can learn the rational fundamental
price. We present an experiment where the fundamental price experiences large un-
expected shocks. Markets with negative expectation feedback (strategic substitutes)
quickly converge to the new fundamental, while markets with positive expectation feed-
back (strategic complements) do not converge, but show under-reaction in the short run
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1and over-reaction in the long run. A simple evolutionary selection model of individual
learning explains these dierences in aggregate outcomes.
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21 Introduction
The rational expectation hypothesis (REH, Muth, 1961, Lucas, 1972) is a cornerstone of
new classical economic analysis. According to this hypothesis, individuals use all available
information and form expectations rationally. If all individuals in the economy have rational
expectations, the market price converges to the rational expectation equilibrium (REE).
Several studies have shown that, even when many agents violate the REH at the individual
decision level, aggregation of individual behavior may enforce convergence of the market
price to the REE (Becker, 1962, Smith, 1962, Gode and Sunder, 1993).
More recently it has been shown that depending on characteristic features of the market
environment and institution, bounded rationality at the individual level may have a dierent
impact on aggregate market behavior. For example, Haltiwanger and Waldman (1989) ar-
gued in a theoretical framework that under strategic complements agents have an incentive
to mimic the strategy of the majority of others, magnifying the impact of irrational players
and making convergence less likely; in contrast under strategic substitutes individuals have
an incentive to do the opposite of what the others do, which makes the impact of irrational
players smaller and enhances the likelihood of convergence. Fehr and Tyran (2002, 2005,
2008) studied the dierences between environments with strategic complements and strategic
substitutes by laboratory experiments. They set up an experiment on money illusion with
a large anticipated shock, and investigate the speed of adjustment of nominal prices to the
new equilibrium for dierent strategic environments. Their main nding is that the price in
the strategic substitutes environment converges to the new equilibrium much more quickly
than that in the strategic complements environment. As their experiment focuses on the
role of money illusion, they provide the subjects with detailed information about the shock,
so that the shock is fully anticipated.
Heemeijer et al (2009) ran \learning to forecast experiments (LtFE)" with human sub-
jects to study whether the aggregation of individual expectations enforces convergence to
REE in markets with positive expectation feedback (and henceforth \positive feedback") and
negative expectation feedback (and henceforth \negative feedback"). The realized market
3price is a function of average individual expectations, and the two market environments only
dier in the sign of the expectations feedback. In a positive feedback market, the realized
price will be high (low) when the individuals in the market predict it to be high (low), as is
e.g. the case in demand driven speculative asset markets. In a negative feedback system the
realized price is low (high) when the individuals in the market predict it to be high (low),
as is e.g. seen in supply driven commodity markets with a production delay. In the con-
text of LtFE, strategic complements is similar positive feedback, and strategic substitutes
is similar to negative feedback. Heemeijer et al (2009) show that the dierence in the type
of expectation feedback alone leads to quite dierent aggregate price behavior when the un-
derlying fundamental price (the REE) is constant. They found that in the case of negative
expectation feedback, the price quickly converges to the REE, while in the case of positive
expectation feedback, the market price is characterized by large uctuations and persistent
deviations from the fundamental.
The purpose of this paper is to study aggregate price behavior in positive and negative
expectation feedback environment after large unanticipated shocks. There are three impor-
tant informational dierences with the experiments by Fehr and Tyran. Firstly, our subjects
know qualitatively how the market works, but have no quantitative information about the
market environment. From the qualitative information they should e.g. be able to infer
whether there is positive respectively negative expectations feedback, but subjects do not
know the exact specication of the price determination mechanism. In contrast, in Fehr in
Tyran (2008) subjects have full information about the market, which they could use to cal-
culate the pre-shock equilibrium price. Secondly, in Fehr and Tyran (2008) the shock is fully
anticipated: subjects know when the shock take place and have enough information to com-
pute the new, after-shock equilibrium price. In our LtFE, subjects are not informed about
the exact timing of the shocks nor do they know the magnitude of the shocks. Thirdly, while
in Fehr and Tyran (2008) subjects know the history of the behavior of their opponents, in
our LtFE subjects are not informed about the forecasts of other individuals. They can only
infer the behavior of other individuals through the aggregate market price. Our experiment
should be seen as a stylized setting where individuals do not fully understand the complex
4market environment they are operating in and try to learn from observed aggregate prices.
We are interested in the stability and convergence properties of the market as an aggregation
mechanism of individual expectations, and whether after a large shock, individuals can learn
the new fundamental price quickly. Our main nding is that negative feedback leads to quick
adjustment to the new, after shock equilibrium, while in a positive feedback market price
adjustment is very slow and characterized by initial underreaction followed by overreaction.
A second contribution of this paper is that we propose a model of heterogeneous in-
dividual expectations and learning to explain the dierent aggregate outcomes in positive
and negative feedback markets. Our heuristic switching model is an extension of Brock and
Hommes (1997), where subjects switch between dierent forecasting rules based upon their
relative performance. In positive feedback markets trend following rules perform well and
reinforce price oscillations leading to persistent deviations from RE equilibrium, and under
and overreaction after a large shock. In negative feedback markets trend following rules per-
form poorly and are outperformed by simple adaptive expectations rule or contrarian rules,
enforcing quick convergence to the new RE equilibrium.
The underreaction and overreaction found in the aggregate market price relate our ex-
periment to the literature on overreaction and underreaction in nancial markets (De Bondt
and Thaler, 1985, Barberis et al, 1998). In nancial economics overreaction and underreac-
tion describe the reaction of stock prices to news about the rm's protability. De Bondt
and Thaler (1985) found from stock price data that people overreact to unexpected news
about a rm's protability in the sense that the price goes up (down) more than it does if
people are using rational Bayesian updating. From the survey by Barberis et al (1998), it
follows that stock prices underreact to news in the short run, in the sense that the change in
protability is slowly incorporated into the price, and overreact in the long run to consistent
patterns of good or bad news in the sense that it may increase or decrease more than what
can be justied by the news. Not much experimental work has been done on overreaction
and underreaction. Although we are not directly testing overreaction and underreaction, our
nding reproduces the characteristic features of nancial markets documented by Barberis
et al (1998), and suggests that the type of expectation feedback system may serve as a good
5explanation for this phenomenon. More recently Noussair and Powell (2009) noticed that
in asset market, the pattern of movement in the fundamental price can inuence market
eciency. They studied two kinds of pattern of fundamental price movement: Peak and
Valley. Peak means the fundamental is increasing in the rst half, and decreasing in the
second, while Valley means it is decreasing in the rst half, and increasing in the second.
Based on an experimental setting similar to Smith et al (1998), they found that the market
price tracked the fundamental better when the fundamental is a Peak than when it is a
Valley. This result suggests that a changing fundamental price may generate results which
are not trivially derived from the case when it is constant. The fundamental price in our
study is similar to a Valley. Our ndings suggest a negative feedback market can even track
the fundamental very well when it is valley. Besides Fehr and Tyran (2008), our paper is
related to other experimental work on the impact of strategic complements and strategic
substitutes on the convergence of market price or level of coordination, such as Chen and
Gazzale (2004), Potters and Suetens (2009). Our work is also related to the LtFEs with
expectations feedbacks between individual forecasts and aggregate market prices in macroe-
conomic models, see e.g. Marimon and Sunder (1993, 1994), Marimon et al (1993), Adam
(2007) and Pfajfar and Zakelj (2009), and in asset pricing models, Hommes et al (2005, 2008)
and Sonnemans and Tuinstra (2008). Hommes (2010) gives a survey of learning to forecast
experiments in macroeconomics and nance. Duy (2008) gives a survey of both \learning
to forecast" and \learning to optimize"1 experiments in macroeconomics.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the experimental design. Sec-
tion 3 presents the experimental results on aggregate market behavior as well as individual
forecasting behavior. Section 4 presents a heuristic switching model explaining individual
expectations as well as aggregate price behavior in both positive and negative feedback
markets. Finally, section 5 concludes.
1Where in addition to making forecasts, the subjects also optimize and make transaction decisions.
62 Experimental Design
2.1 Treatments
A computerized experiment was conducted in the CREED laboratory at the University
of Amsterdam May 18-20, 2009. 16 experimental markets were created, half of them with
positive feedback (P1;P2;P3;:::;P8), and the other half negative feedback (N1;N2;N3;:::;N8).
There are 6 subjects in each experimental market. Subjects are asked to forecast the market
price for 65 periods. The 65 periods are divided into 3 phases: period 1-20, 21-43 and 44-65.
Figure 5 in the appendix shows the computer screen the subjects see during the experiment.
In the appendix there are also experimental instructions for both treatments. Participants
are shown the history of market prices and their own predictions, but not the predictions of
others. The participants are provided qualitative information about the market, e.g. that
the market price will increase (decrease) when there is excess demand (supply). Subjects are
also informed that there may be large persistent changes in supply or demand, but they do
not know when and how large the shocks will be. Before the experiment starts, participants
are asked to answer four control questions to make sure that they understand the experiment.
2.2 Expectation Feedback








h;t is the average price forecast of all subjects in the group (experimental
market), and f is a linear map.
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Here t  N(0;0:09) represents small demand/supply shocks. The (time varying) RE
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56 when 1  t  20;
41 when 21  t  43;
62 when 44  t  65
The shifts in the RE equilibrium p
t represent the large unexpected shocks in period 21 and
44. The two treatments are comparable, because they have the same REE, as well as the
same absolute value of the slope of the linear feedback function. 2 Because the absolute
value of the slope is smaller than 1, this REE p
t is stable under naive expectations, which is
if pe
h;t = pt 1 for all h.
2.3 Individual Earnings
Subjects are asked to make predictions about the future prices. They earn more money if
their prediction is closer to the realized price. The individual earnings h;t per period are
based on the quadratic prediction error:







where 1300 points corresponds to 0.5 Euro, and the subjects will earn 0 if their prediction
error is larger than 7. The experiment lasts for about 90 minutes, and the subjects' average
earnings are about 30 euro.
2Heemeijer et al (2009) provides a microfoundation for the price adjustment rules (2) and (3), with demand
and supply derived from wealth and prot maximization. The negative feedback market corresponds to a
cobweb \hog-cycle" model, while the positive feedback market corresponds to an asset-pricing model with a
market maker price adjustment rule. However, in their experiment the fundamental is a constant (p
t  60)
for all 50 periods.
83 Experimental Results
3.1 Aggregate Price Behavior
Figure 1 plots the realized market price averaged over 8 markets (top panels), the price
for each market (second panels) as well as the individual predictions in one typical market
(bottom panels) in the case of positive feedback (left panels) and negative feedback (right
panels) respectively. The RE equilibrium is represented by the dotted line.
The negative feedback markets generally make an almost perfect adjustment to the RE
price after each large shock. The market experiences a short high volatility phase of about 3-5
periods, after which the prices neatly converge to the (new) rational expectations equilibrium
price.
A Wilcoxon signed rank test is performed in the negative feedback markets to see whether
the median of the market price is 56 in period 1-20, 41 in period 21-43, and 62 in period
44-65. We can not reject the null hypothesis that the median of the market price over time
is equal to the rational expectation equilibrium in each group.
The results for the positive feedback markets are very dierent, as illustrated in Figure
1. Although the agents quickly coordinate on a common prediction from the very beginning
of the experiment (see the time series of individual predictions), the market price does not
quickly converge to equilibrium in the positive feedback markets.
A Wilcoxon signed rank test is performed on each positive feedback market to see whether
the median of the market price is 56 in period 1-20, 41 in period 23-43, and 62 in period
44-65. The null hypothesis that the median of the market price over time is equal to the
rational expectation equilibrium is rejected for 5 out 8 groups.3 This result conrms that
for most of the positive feedback markets the market price does not converge to the REE.
Coordination of individual expectation and convergence towards the RE fundamental
3Groups P1;P2;P4;P5, and P6.














































































































































































Figure 1: The average realized price over all groups (top panel), the market prices for dierent
groups (middle panel) and individual predictions in group P8 (bottom left) and group N8
(bottom right) plotted together with fundamental price (dotted line).
10price is illustrated in Figure 2. The upper graph shows the distance between the fundamental
price and the median of the market price over all groups, for both treatments. In the negative
feedback treatment, after each large shock the median of the deviation of the market price
from the fundamental quickly decreases to 0 and stays there during each phase. In contrast,
in the positive feedback treatment, after each large shock, the deviation of the price from the
fundamental decreases in a sluggish way, and even goes up occasionally during each phase.
This behavior ts the description of stock prices by Barberis et al (1998), characterized
by the underreaction at short and overreaction at longer time horizons. We nd that the
market price in the negative feedback treatment deviates from the fundamental price less
(statistically signicant at the 5% level by a paired sample sign test for all periods except
period 1, 2, 21 and 44), and therefore negative feedback markets exhibit a higher level of
price convergence.
Another way to dene convergence is to track whether the market price enters a small
neighborhood of the fundamental price, for instance, the interval within the fundamental
price plus or minus 3% and stays there. The intervals are [54.32, 57.68] for period 1 to 20,
[39.77, 42.23] for period 21 to 43 and [60.14, 63.86] for period 44 to 65. We nd that the
market price in all groups in the negative feedback treatment converges to and stays within
this 3% neighborhood within 5 periods, while none of the groups in the positive feedback
treatment does.
Figure 2 also shows that there is little dispersion of individual predictions, as shown by
the time series of the median over groups of the standard error of individual predictions in
the bottom panel. A low standard deviation means that the participants in the same group
have a high level of consensus on the future price. The median of the standard error of
individual predictions is smaller in the positive feedback treatment in all periods during the
rst phase, in periods 22 to 32 in the second phase, and in periods 45 and 50 in the third
phase. In the other periods the participants in the negative feedback also reach consensus
because of the convergence of the market price to the RE equilibrium.
In summary, in the positive feedback market individuals quickly coordinate on a common








































Figure 2: The upper graph shows the distance between the fundamental price and the
median of the market prices from dierent groups. The lower graph shows the median of
the standard deviations of the predictions in the dierent groups. The squares represent the
negative feedback treatment, and the circles represent the positive feedback treatment.
12forecast, but they coordinate on a \wrong" non-equilibrium price. In the negative feedback
markets after a large shock some individuals disagree with the majority. Heterogeneity
is more persistent, and stabilizes price dynamics. After that the price has converged and
consensus about price prediction is achieved.
3.2 Individual Prediction Rules
3.2.1 Rational expectations
We compare the individual predictions with the REE for each of the three phases, using
Wilcoxon signed rank tests (i.e. whether the median of each individual's prediction is 56 in
period 1-20, 41 in period 21-43 and 62 in period 44-65). For the negative feedback markets
the null hypothesis is rejected for 11 individuals in period 1-20, for 6 individuals in period
21-43 and for 11 individuals in period 44-65. For the positive feedback markets the null
hypothesis is rejected for 20 individuals in period 1-20, 24 individuals in period 21-43 and 13
individuals in period 44-65. The number of individuals for whom we can not reject the null
hypothesis for all periods is 26 out of 48 (more than 50%) for the negative feedback markets
and 9 out of 48 (less than 25%) for the positive feedback markets.
This result suggests that it is not likely that most of the individuals predict the rational
expectation equilibrium. The fact that there are more individuals for whom we can not reject
the null hypothesis of rational expectations in the negative feedback markets suggests that
it may be easier for the individuals to learn the REE in a negative feedback environment.
3.2.2 Estimation of Linear Prediction Rules
We estimate linear prediction rules used by the participants of the following form,
p
e








h;t i + t (5)
and nd that the prediction rules of most participants can be captured by this simple rule
very well. (i.e. with signicant coecients at the 5% level, high adjusted R2, low MSE
13and no serial correlation.) Tables A:1 and A:2 in the appendix show the estimation result.
We nd that all estimated rules from the negative feedback have at least one signicant
coecient, and 47 out of 48 rules from the positive feedback have at least one signicant
coecient. The average adjusted R2 is 0.9723 for the positive feedback and 0.9478 for the
negative feedback. The average MSE is 1.6828 for the positive feedback and 4.8318 for the
negative feedback. The regressions suer very little from serial correlation, as the residuals
of the regressions do not have signicant autocorrelation in the rst 10 lags for 41 out
of 48 rules in the negative feedback, and for 43 out of 48 rules in the positive feedback.
Because the fundamental price is dierent in the three phases of this experiment, we need to
check whether the econometric model is stable across the three phases, meaning that there
is no structural break. We implement a Chow test on breakpoints to check the stability
of the model. The breakpoints chosen are period 21 and 44, meaning that under the null
hypothesis this econometric model is the same before the rst shock, between the rst and
second shock, and after the second shock. Surprisingly, we reject the null hypothesis of no
structural breaks for 44 out of 48 rules (around 92%) in the negative feedback, and for 17
out of 48 rules (around 33%) in the positive feedback. That means that about 2/3 of all
the subjects \observe" the shock and change their prediction rules, and the subjects in the
negative feedback treatment are more likely to change their rules than the subjects in the
positive feedback treatment. The explanation for this might be that in the negative feedback
treatment the subjects usually have a very high chance to learn when the shock happens, and
therefore adjust their prediction strategy accordingly. In contrast, in the positive feedback
treatment the subjects coordinate on a common rule and learn the large shock only gradually,
so it is less likely that they will change their prediction strategy abruptly.
3.2.3 Estimation of Simple Heuristics
The estimation result of linear rules with 3 lags in the last subsection shows that there
is a lot of heterogeneity across individuals. We estimate some simpler (more restricted)
rules. An advantage of these simpler rules or heuristics is that they allow for a behavioral
interpretation. The estimation result is shown in Table A:3, A:4, A:5 and A:6 in the appendix
14A:3.
We consider two types of simple rules. The rst type of simple rule is a trend rule, where
the participants extrapolate a price change from the last observed price.
p
e
h;t 1 = pt 1 + (pt 1   pt 2): (6)
A positive coecient  means a trend following rule, meaning that people expect a price
increase when they see a previous increase; while a negative coecient  means a contrarian
rule, meaning that people expect a price decrease when they see a previous price increase.
Table A:3 and A:4 show the estimation results of equation (6). For most individuals in the
positive feedback treatment, the coecient  is positive and in the range [0:4;1] and for
most individuals in the negative feedback treatment, the coecient  is negative and in the
range [ 0:5; 0:2]. This coecient  is usually signicant at the 5% level (it is signicant
for 44 out of 48 subjects in the negative feedback treatment, and for 45 out of 48 subjects
in the positive feedback treatment), the adjusted R2 for the signicant models is large (it is
on average 0.9890 for the positive feedback, and 0.9045 for the negative feedback) and the
MSE of the regression is low (it is on average 0.8995 for the positive feedback, and 8.2069
for the negative feedback treatment).4





t 1 + w(pt 1   p
e
t 1); (7)
where the prediction is a weighted average of the previous prediction and the last ob-
served price. Tables A:5 and A:6 show the estimation result of equation (7). The estimated
coecient w is close to 1 for most subjects in the positive feedback treatment, and between
0.6-0.8 in the negative feedback treatment. This coecient w is signicant at the 5% level
for all individuals, the adjusted R2 is large (it is on average 0.9488 for the positive feedback
4Most of the rules however do not pass the serial correlation test (the rules pass the test for serial
correlation for only 17 out of 48 subjects (about 35%) in the negative feedback, and 26 out of 48 subjects
(about 55%) in the positive feedback treatment).
15treatment, and 0.9159 for the negative feedback treatment) and the MSE of the regression is
low (it is on average 3.2096 for the positive feedback treatment, and 7.8034 for the negative
feedback treatment). 5
The above results suggest that some of the subjects use simple forecasting heuristics.
3.3 Benchmark Homogeneous Expectation Models
Figure 3 shows the simulated price and prediction series if all the group members are using
adaptive or trend rules. We take w = 0:85 for the adaptive rule,  = 0:9 for the trend
following rule, and  =  0:3 for the contrarian rule, because these are the medians of the
successful (signicant, without serial correlation and structural break) rules we get from
estimation. Figure 3 shows one-period ahead simulation with homogeneous expectations. In
each period, the model imports the price data from the experiment so that the simulation is
using the same history the human subjects in the laboratory experiment use. As is shown
in the gure for one representative group in each treatment6, the contrarian rule ts best
for the negative feedback treatment, and the trend following rule ts best for the positive
feedback treatment treatment. However, none of these simple rules can describe the data
pattern for all groups in the experiment.
These results suggest that similar subjects may use dissimilar heuristics in dierent sit-
uations. Moreover, they may switch between the dierent rules during the experiment. A
model with evolutionary selection between these simple rules may therefore work well for
these experimental data.
5Most of the rules can not pass the serial correlation test (the rules pass the test for serial correlation
for only 5 out of 48 subjects (about 10%) in the negative feedback treatment, and for 24 out of 48 subjects
(about 50%) in the positive feedback treatment).
6The same result holds for other groups in the same treatment.






































































































Figure 3: Experimental and simulated prices in the positive (left panel, group P8) and neg-
ative feedback treatment (right panel, group N8) under dierent homogeneous expectation
rules: adaptive expectations (top panel), trend following rule (middle panel) and contrarian
rule (bottom panel). The squares represent the price in experimental market, and the circles
represent the one period ahead price forecast of the dierent prediction rules.
174 Heuristic Switching Models (HSM)
Anufriev and Hommes (2009) provide a heuristic switching model, an extension of Brock and
Hommes (1997)7, which is able to explain substantially dierent price dynamics (monotonic
convergence, persistent oscillations and dampened oscillations) in dierent groups in the asset
pricing experiment of Hommes et al (2005). The key idea of the model is that the subjects
chose between four simple heuristics depending upon their relative performance. The model
is developed to explain the experimental data from a 2-period ahead LtFE asset pricing
experiment (with positive feedback). There are two trend following rules in the model, a
weak and a strong trend following rule. Since there is a negative feedback treatment in our
experiment, we replace one trend following rule by a contrarian rule, which is able to detect
short run up and down oscillation in negative feedback markets. The four rules in our model
are therefore as follows:





t + 0:85(pt   p
e
t;1): (8)
The contrarian rules (CTR) given by:
p
e
t+1;2 = pt   0:3(pt   pt 1): (9)
A trend extrapolating rule (TRE) given by:
p
e
t+1;2 = pt + 0:9(pt   pt 1): (10)






t + pt) + (pt   pt 1): (11)
The rule uses a time varying anchor, 0:5(pav
t +pt), which is the average of the last price and
the sample mean of all past prices, and extrapolates the last price change pt  pt 1. Because
7For related models on reinforcement learning, see e.g. Erev and Roth (1998) and Camerer and Ho (1999).
Hommes (2010) discusses the dierences between the dierent models.
18of its exible time-varying anchor, the A&A rule was successful in explaining persistent
oscillations in Anufriev and Hommes (2009).
Subjects switch between these rules depending upon their relative performance. The
performance of heuristic h, h 2 f1;2;3;4g is measured by the squared prediction error8:
Ut;h =  (pt   p
e
t;h)
2 + Ut 1;h; (12)
and nh;t is the fraction of the agents using heuristic h in the whole population. The
parameter  2 [0;1] shows the relative weight the agents give to past errors compared to the
most recent one. When  = 0, only the most recent performance is taken into account, and
when  > 0, all past errors matter for the performance. The specic weight updating rule
is given by a discrete choice model with asynchronous updating from Hommes, Huang and
Wang (2005) and Diks and van der Weide (2005):





The parameter  2 [0;1] reects the inertia with which participants stick to their rule.
When  = 1, the agents simply do not update. When  > 0, each period a fraction of
1    participants updates their weights. The parameter   0 represents the \sensitivity"
to switch to another strategy. The higher the , the faster the participants switch to more
successful rules in the recent previous periods. When  = 0, the agents will put equal weight
on each rule. When  = +1, all agents who update switch to the most successful rule.
Figure 4 shows one period ahead simulation from this model, with parameter settings
 = 0:4; = 0:7; = 0:9, [n1;1;n1;2;n1;3;n1;4] = [0:25;0:25;0:25;0:25], and the initial price
as in the experiment. This simulation uses exactly the same parameters as in Anufriev and
Hommes (2009), who tted the model to a dierent experiment, as a benchmark simulation.
As shown in Figure 4, the HSM model ts the experimental data quite nicely. The evo-
8Note that the participants in this experiment were also paid according to the quadratic prediction errors.








































































Figure 4: Experimental and simulated prices using HSM model in one typical group from
the positive (top left, group P8) and negative feedback treatment (bottom left, group N8)
respectively; blue squares are the experimental data, and red circles are simulated prices
from the HSM model. The right panels show the evolution of market heuristics in the
positive (top right) and negative feedback treatments (bottom right). The trend following
rule dominates in the positive feedback markets, while the contrarian rule dominates in the
negative feedback markets.
20lution of the forecasts using the dierent heuristics shows immediately that the dominating
rules are dierent for the two treatments. In the negative feedback treatment the contrar-
ian rule dominates, while in the positive feedback the trend following rule dominates. The
weights of the rules also exhibit \kinks" around the period of the fundamental shocks, which
suggest the subjects may adjust the weights on dierent strategies as a response to the shock.
We can compare the one period ahead forecast performance (Mean Squared Error) of
this HSM model with other models. Table 1 shows the MSE of 9 dierent models: rational
expectations, naive expectations, each of the homogeneous rules of the HSM and the three
versions of the HSM. These versions are dierent in the choice of parameters ; and . In
the \HSM Benchmark" we use exactly the same parameter settings  = 0:4; = 0:7; = 0:9
as in Anufriev and Hommes (2009). In the \HSM Experiment" we use a grid search to choose
the parameters that minimize the total MSE of all groups in both treatments ( = 0:4; =
0:9; = 0:9). Finally, in the \HSM Group" we use grid search to choose the parameters that
minimize the MSE for each group independently (parameters are reported in Table 1).
The MSE are shown in Table 1, with the best model in bold. The rational expectation
model does not perform well in both treatments. The contrarian rule performs well in the
negative feedback markets, while it does not perform well in the positive feedback markets.
In particular, the contrarian rule does relatively well in the initial periods after the shocks,
since it is the only rule picking up the up and down oscillation of the negative feedback
markets. The trend following rule performs well in the positive feedback markets, while it
performs poorly in the negative feedback markets. The HSM Benchmark model already gives
a very good t. The HSM Group model gives the smallest MSE for 5 out of 8 groups in the
positive feedback treatment, and 3 out of 8 groups in the negative feedback treatment. There
is not too much dierence between the HSM Experiment and HSM Group model, although
the parameters might be quite dierent. This suggests that the HSM model is not very
sensitive to parameterizations. The HSM model performs slightly worse than the contrarian
rule in the negative feedback because the three other rules work poorly. The fact that the
HSM beats the trend following rule in the positive feedback means although trend following
is the rule with smallest MSE on average, there might still be some periods where other rules
21Specication P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
RE fundamental 49.6788 59.0161 43.1575 48.5947 47.0988 55.0887 58.01 59.9699
naive 0.4365 1.0085 1.6888 1.1457 1.3727 1.6121 2.3773 2.6978
A&A 9.2946 3.3583 17.0959 17.93 15.5062 19.8566 22.4779 26.9912
ADA 0.6416 1.0312 2.3984 1.6715 1.8937 2.2959 3.3155 3.6962
CTR 0.8198 1.111 2.9892 2.1113 2.3613 2.8641 4.1159 4.5494
TRE 0.1237 2.0319 0.087 0.0711 0.4464 0.0766 0.3679 0.6186
HSM Benchmark 0.124 1.0722 0.3299 0.2094 0.5857 0.2934 0.6281 0.8504
HSM Experiment 0.0798 1.0738 0.1498 0.0961 0.5058 0.1257 0.4693 0.7081
HSM Group 0.0575 1.0309 0.0803 0.0544 0.4512 0.0585 0.3622 0.6247
 2 [0;10] 0.4 5.0 0.9 0.6 0.9 0.7 0.4 10.0
 2 [0;1] 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
 2 [0;1] 0.7 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5
Specication N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 N7 N8
RE fundamental 12.6053 10.1736 10.3248 13.1536 11.9303 22.3631 10.0034 10.4805
naive 10.1551 5.9233 5.9417 9.2668 12.4492 15.4041 6.646 6.2231
A&A 83.8716 68.7025 71.8386 72.7769 80.2038 107.7959 67.9707 70.8805
ADA 5.4345 2.5167 2.3009 5.8456 7.5808 10.4852 3.0471 2.6081
CTR 3.0418 1.2676 0.9119 5.1556 4.9136 9.9613 1.7995 1.1486
TRE 90.3862 72.7919 76.1975 82.4144 88.1665 133.8282 72.879 75.4719
HSM Benchmark 6.8339 4.0172 4.3782 5.9768 7.5264 10.7787 4.1725 3.5143
HSM Experiment 3.8852 1.937 2.4366 4.9945 5.0702 10.9711 2.2419 1.3874
HSM Group 3.2117 1.9105 2.2515 4.9945 4.8011 9.3121 2.0943 1.2992
 2 [0;10] 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.6
 2 [0;1] 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9
 2 [0;1] 0 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.8 0 0.5 0.5
Table 1: MSE of the one-period ahead forecast for dierent groups in the positive (upper)
and negative (lower) feedback treatment. HSM Benchmark means the HSM model with pa-
rameters  = 0:4; = 0:7; = 0:9. HSM Experiment means the HSM model with parameters
that give the best t according to the average MSE of all groups in the both treatments,
which is  = 0:4; = 0:9; = 0:9. HSM Group means the HSM model with parameters that
give the best t according to the MSE for this group, with parameters ;; shown in the
bottom.
22can do better (meaning people are really using dierent rules in dierent periods). While the
homogeneous contrarian rule does well in negative feedback markets and the trend following
rule does well in positive feedback markets, the key point is that none of the homogeneous
expectation model does well in both treatments.
In order to make an overall comparison we can calculate the average MSE in all groups
of both treatments. The results are in Table 2. It is obvious that if we compare according
to average MSE in both treatments, the HSM benchmark already performs well. HSM
experiment outperforms all homogenous expectation models, which means it gives a very
good description of the overall pattern of the data from the whole experiment. The parameter
setting of HSM experiment is not very dierent from HSM benchmark, which also suggests
that the HSM is not very sensitive to the parameters. HSM Group is the model with the
best t. The improvement (reduction of MSE) from the best homogenous agent model
(homogenous model with the contrarian rule) to the best HSM is about 30%.
5 Conclusion and Discussion
Testing the \rational expectation" hypothesis (Muth, 1961, Lucas, 1972) may actually mean
two things: (1) to test whether the market price \reects" the market clearing equilibrium
when the equilibrium stays constant, (2) to test whether the market price quickly converges to
the new equilibrium after large shocks to the fundamental price. We have shown that the type
of expectation feedback is a key factor in how individual expectations and aggregate market
prices respond to large unanticipated shocks. While in the negative feedback markets the
price converges to the new equilibrium almost immediately perfectly, the positive feedback
system generally moves towards the new equilibrium slowly, and moreover overshots the
new fundamental. This ts the \underreaction at the beginning, and overreaction in the
long run" story from empirical work on nancial markets (see Barberis et al (1998)), and
therefore suggests that the positive feedback feature of speculative asset market alone may
be the main force that causes this phenomenon.
23Treatment Positive Negative Both
RE fundamental 52.5768 12.6293 32.6031
naive 1.5424 9.0012 5.2718
A&A 16.5638 78.0051 47.2844
ADA 2.1180 4.9774 3.5477
CTR 2.6153 3.5250 3.0701
TRE 0.4779 86.5170 43.4974
HSM Benchmark 0.5116 5.8997 3.2057
HSM Experiment 0.4010 4.1155 2.2583
HSM Group 0.3400 3.7344 2.0372
Table 2: The average MSE in negative feedback treatment, positive feedback treatment and
both treatments (as an average of positive and negative feedback treatment) with 9 models.
HSM Experiment means the HSM model with parameters that give the best t according to
the average MSE of all groups in both treatments, which is  = 0:4; = 0:9; = 0:9. HSM
Group means the HSM model with parameters that give the best t according to the MSE
of this group.
24The simulations of individual prediction rules show that neither rational expectation
nor a homogeneous agent model with one simple heuristic is able to capture all the data
from both treatments. Models with heterogeneous expectations and reinforcement learning,
e.g. Brock and Hommes (1997), Branch (2004), and Anufriev and Hommes (2009) t these
experiments quite well. Agents switch between dierent prediction heuristics, based upon
past forecast performance. In positive feedback markets the trend following rule performs
well, thus reinforcing price trends and causing persistent deviations from the fundamentals.
In negative feedback markets the trend following rule performs poorly and is outperformed
by adaptive or contrarian rules, enforcing quick convergence to the new equilibrium. Future
work should investigate whether this theory of expectation formation ts more complicated
expectation feedback systems in nance and macroeconomics.
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28A Appendix
A.1 Experimental instructions (for negative feedback)
General information
In this experiment you participate in a market. Your role in the market is an advisor of
a large rm, and the rm is a major Producer of one product sold in the market. In each
period the rm asks you to make a prediction of the market price of the product. The price
should be predicted one period ahead, since producing the good takes some time. You are
going to advise the rm for 65 successive time periods. For each period you have to make a
prediction for the price in the next period. Your earnings from the experiment will depend
on the accuracy of your predictions. The smaller your prediction error is, the greater your
earnings are.
About the market
The price of the product will be determined by the law of supply and demand. The
supply on the market is determined by the production decision of the producers. There
are several large producers on this market and each of them is advised by a participant of
this experiment. Higher price predictions make a producer produce a larger quantity, which
increases the supply and vise versa. Total supply is largely determined by the sum of the
individual supplies of these producers, although there may be small random uctuations
caused by transportation delay or other reasons.
The size of the demand depends upon the price. When the price goes up, the demand
will go down. In some periods there may be large persistent changes in the demand, caused
by demand from other international markets or other reasons.
About the price determination
The price is determined as follows. If total demand is larger than total supply, the price
will rise. Conversely, if total supply is larger than total demand, the price will fall.
29About the price prediction
The only task of the advisors in this experiment is to predict the market price in each time
period as accurately as possible. Your prediction should always lie between 0 and 100 euros
in the each period. At the beginning of the experiment you are asked to give a prediction
for the price period 1. When all participants have submitted their predictions for the rst
period, the market price for period 1 will be made public. Based on the prediction error in
period 1, which is the dierence between the market price and your prediction, your earnings
in the rst period will be calculated. The larger your prediction error is, the less earning
you are going to make for this period. Subsequently, you are asked to enter your prediction
for period 2. When all participants have submitted their prediction for the second period,
the market price for that period, will be made public and your earnings will be calculated,
and so on, for all 65 consecutive periods. The information you can refer to form at period t
consists of all previous prices, your predictions and earnings.
About the earnings
Your earnings depend only on the accuracy of your predictions. The earnings shown on
the computer screen will be in terms of points. The maximum possible points you can make
for each period (if you make no prediction error) is 1300, and the larger your prediction error
is, the fewer points you can make. You will earn 0 points if your prediction error is larger
than 7. There is a Payo Table on your table, which shows the points you can earn for
dierent prediction errors. For example, your prediction was 13.42. The true market price
turned out to be 12.13. This means that the prediction error is: 13:42   12:13  1:30. The
table then says your earnings are 1255 credits (as listed in the rst column).
We will pay you in cash at the end of the experiment based on the points you earned.
You earn 0.5 euro for each 1300 points you make.
30A.2 Experimental instructions (for positive feedback)
In our experiment the experimental instructions are exactly the same for positive and neg-
ative feedback treatments except the part \General information" and \About the market".
The paragraphs of \General information" and \about the market" for positive feedback are
as follows:
General information
In this experiment you participate in a market. Your role in the market is an advisor
of a trading company who is active on a market for a certain product. In each time period
the trading company needs to decide how many units of the product he will buy, intending
to sell them again the next period. To take an optimal decision, the company asks you to
make a prediction of the market price of the product during 65 successive time periods. Your
earnings during the experiment will depend on the accuracy of your predictions. The smaller
your prediction error is, the greater earnings you will get at the end of the experiment.
About the market
The price of the product will be determined by the law of supply and demand. Supply
and demand on the market are determined by the trading companies (you are advising one
of them) of the product. Higher price predictions make a trading company demand a larger
quantity and vise versa. A high price prediction also makes the trading company less willing
to sell the product in this period, which decreases the supply and vise versa. There are
several large trading companies active on this market and each of them is advised by a
participant of this experiment.
Total supply and demand is largely determined by the sum of the individual supplies and
demands of these companies. There are two kinds of exogenous shocks which may aect the
total supply and demand: (1) in each period, there may be small random uctuations in
the supply caused by transportation delay or other reasons. (2) In some periods, there may
large persistent changes in the demand caused by demand from other international markets
or other reasons.
31Computer instructions (Please read this after you nish the check questions)
During the experiment your computer screen will look like this, please read instruction
(1)-(3) carefully:
Figure 5: The computer screen during the experiment.
In the mini-page at the top you can submit your prediction of the price in the next period.
The title "You Prediction for period XX" will tell you for which period you are predicting.
You have to enter your prediction as a number between 0 and 100. You can use numbers
with at most 2 digits after the decimal point (for example, 25, 34.7 and 55.66). Please DO
use the decimal point ("."), NOT comma (",") when you want to use decimal numbers.
After you made your prediction please press "send" to submit. You might need to wait
for other participants in the same market before continuing to the next period. The market
32price for the next period will be calculated once all the members in the same market have
submitted their predictions. Then you continue with the prediction in the next period for
the price in the period after the next period, and so on
The graph in the left hand side below the prediction window shows the history of your
prediction and the market price. The table in the right hand side below the prediction
window shows the history of your prediction, the market price, as well as the point you
earned in each period and in total. The more recent information is put closer to the top.
You can use your mouse and the stroller to trace the information in older past.
The graph and the table will be updated in the beginning of each new period. Please
notice that the price and prediction information in the above graph and table is just for
illustration. The data are generated randomly. So it does not have any implication on what
will really happen in our experiment.
When everyone nishes the instructions and the check questions, we will begin the ex-
periment. If you have questions now or during the experiment, raise your hand. Someone
will come to you for assistance.




 3 p 1 p 2 p 3 R2 MSE Chow AC
exp11 0 0.4622 0 0 0.647 0 0 0.9611 3.8061 Y N
exp12 0 -0.24 0 0 0.6394 0.448 0 0.9528 4.2924 Y N
exp13 0 -0.3457 0 0 0.4103 0.6421 0.1889 0.9789 1.8968 Y N
exp14 0 0.6054 0 0 0.3871 0 0 0.9541 3.5275 Y N
exp15 0 -0.5303 0 0.2836 0.3934 0.5331 0.2948 0.9594 3.5433 Y N
exp16 0 0 0 -0.1405 0.7417 0.2772 0 0.9614 3.9787 Y N
exp21 0 0.464 0 0 0.7071 0 0 0.9586 3.7491 Y N
exp22 0 0.4538 0 0 0.5028 0.2493 -0.1455 0.9963 0.3333 Y Y
exp23 0 0.4356 -0.2405 0.1253 0.7322 -0.2315 0.1828 0.99 0.8982 Y N
exp24 0 0 0 0.0603 0.7102 0.4216 0 0.9815 1.7375 Y N
exp25 0 0.4352 0 0 0.2214 0.2962 0 0.9258 6.1082 Y N
exp26 0 0.2842 0 0.0967 0.9312 -0.3726 0.1704 0.9918 0.8104 Y N
exp31 0 -0.1964 -0.2181 0.1008 0.8384 0.3108 0 0.9805 1.8719 Y N
exp32 0 0.4275 0 0 0.3867 0 0 0.9607 3.1034 Y N
exp33 0 0.62 -0.3234 0.0843 0.7522 -0.2415 0 0.9911 0.8506 Y Y
exp34 0 0.2655 0 -0.0727 0.7056 0 -0.0938 0.9985 0.1363 Y Y
exp35 0 0.6708 0 0 0.4036 -0.1087 0 0.9588 3.0188 Y N
exp36 0 0 0 0 0.6343 0.2686 0 0.9572 4.2695 Y N
exp41 0 0.9632 -0.5815 0.1789 0.8975 -0.8803 0.394 0.9645 3.2426 Y N
exp42 0 0.538 -0.2784 0 0.2498 0.2249 0.1284 0.9422 5.0076 Y N
exp43 0 0.2415 -0.2837 0.3586 0.7107 -0.3372 0.2976 0.8642 13.7563 N N
exp44 0 0.2505 -0.3411 0.2615 0.6192 0 0.1956 0.9591 3.6552 Y N
exp45 0 0.3244 0 0 0.7681 0 0 0.9664 3.1572 Y N
exp46 0 0 0 0 0.5798 0 0 0.9359 5.2838 Y N
exp51 0 0 0.1336 0.1595 0.4755 0.3884 0 0.9572 3.6324 Y Y
exp52 0 0 0 0.1458 0.6134 0.1615 0 0.9548 3.971 Y N
exp53 0 0 0.2501 0 0.0635 0.4535 0.2991 0.9755 2.1254 Y Y
exp54 0 -0.3746 0 0.154 0.5987 0.4135 0.2705 0.9457 5.0186 Y Y
exp55 0 0 0 0.106 0.6287 0.2335 0 0.9731 2.3915 Y N
exp56 0 0 0 0 0.6365 0.3284 0 0.8156 19.0925 N N
exp61 0 -0.2057 0 0.3473 0.4015 0.2203 0.1926 0.9185 7.3438 Y N
exp62 0 0.3444 -0.2242 0.2469 1.0738 -0.548 0 0.9472 6.3421 Y N
exp63 0 0.4328 0 0.1801 0.8452 -0.4299 0 0.9622 3.9672 Y N
exp64 6.7799 0 0 0 0.9524 0 0 0.8199 24.875 N N
exp65 0 0 0 0 0 0.3765 0.299 0.6299 39.7841 N N
exp66 0 0 0 0.3641 0.1507 0.1522 0.2187 0.9269 5.6884 Y N
exp71 0 0 0 0.2288 0.6091 0 0.2577 0.9644 3.0881 Y N
exp72 0 0 0 0.1363 0.6493 0 0.1835 0.9659 2.9821 Y N
exp73 0 0 0 0.1062 0.6551 0.2641 0.1113 0.9955 0.3976 Y N
exp74 0 0 0 0.0931 0.6801 0 0 0.9836 1.3959 Y N
exp75 -1.1827 0.1989 0 0 0.5264 0.36 -0.0832 0.9955 0.4197 Y N
exp76 0 0.4835 -0.3622 0.1862 0.3511 0 0.2607 0.9746 2.0488 Y N
exp81 0 -0.3883 -0.2326 0.1181 0.6122 0.5739 0.2967 0.965 3.19 Y N
exp82 0 0.3897 0 0 0.3313 0.1371 0.1519 0.946 4.2728 Y N
exp83 0 0 0 0 0.8386 0 0 0.9632 3.5895 Y N
exp84 0 -0.193 -0.2321 0 0.8515 0.3506 0.185 0.9854 1.4175 Y Y
exp85 0 0.553 -0.2257 0.1283 0.5193 0 0 0.989 0.9377 Y Y
exp86 0 0 0 0 0.5768 0.304 0 0.9775 1.9208 Y N
Table A.1: Above is the result for estimating pe








h;t i + t for the
negative feedback treatment. The rst column shows the participant number. The second to
eights column shows the estimated coecients. We start from the largest possible model and
drop all the coecients that are not signicant at 5% level. The ninth and tenth columns
show the R2 and MSE of the regressions. The twelfth shows whether we reject the null




 3 p 1 p 2 p 3 R2 MSE Chow AC
exp11 0 0 0 0 1.3677 0 -0.2909 0.9975 0.121 N N
exp12 1.1632 0.556 0 0 1.3571 -0.9944 0 0.9984 0.0765 Y N
exp13 0 0.2726 0 0 1.4246 -0.6749 0 0.9989 0.0529 N N
exp14 0 0 0 0 1.8891 -1.4069 0 0.9973 0.1274 N N
exp15 0 0.4342 0 0 1.3325 -0.8467 0 0.9986 0.0704 N N
exp16 1.0477 0.8928 0.119 -0.0692 1.2435 -1.3469 0 0.999 0.048 Y Y
exp21 0.5901 0.561 0 0.0242 1.6833 -1.5427 0.297 0.9988 0.0162 Y N
exp22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1874 36.4388 N N
exp23 0 0.4998 0 -0.1976 1.4443 -1.144 0.3596 0.9908 0.1151 Y N
exp24 0 0.4537 -0.1405 0.1113 0.6647 0 -0.1851 0.9913 0.0968 Y Y
exp25 3.4909 0.3665 0 0 0.731 0 0 0.9266 0.7579 N N
exp26 1.6552 0 0 -0.0417 1.0412 0 -0.1203 0.9968 0.0353 Y Y
exp31 0.5881 0.3303 0 -0.0625 1.6603 -1.2094 0 0.9987 0.1127 N N
exp32 0 -0.292 0 -0.1666 2.2084 -0.9762 0 0.9985 0.1305 Y N
exp33 1.0534 0 0 0 1.3029 0 -0.4897 0.9949 0.4537 N N
exp34 0.6943 0 0 0 1.9112 -1.0784 0 0.9985 0.1284 N N
exp35 0.5784 0.354 0 0 1.7423 -1.2642 0 0.9989 0.0953 Y N
exp36 0 0 0 0 1.2791 0 -0.2964 0.9973 0.2419 Y N
exp41 0 0.4202 0 0 1.6719 -1.3097 0 0.9986 0.1291 N N
exp42 0 0.423 0 0 1.9483 -1.8616 0.4256 0.9993 0.0601 Y N
exp43 0 0 0 0 1.7329 -0.8071 0 0.9992 0.0691 Y N
exp44 2.106 0 0 0 0.9343 0 -0.5863 0.9914 0.736 N N
exp45 0 0 0 0 1.3728 0 0 0.9971 0.2753 N N
exp46 0 0 0.1588 -0.17 1.788 -1.0548 0 0.9987 0.1191 N N
exp51 -0.5089 0 0 0 1.6441 -0.5496 0 0.9989 0.0945 Y N
exp52 0 0 0 0 2.7746 -2.72 0 0.908 8.101 N N
exp53 0 0 0 0 2.3302 0 0 0.9472 4.1499 N N
exp54 0 0 0 0 1.9597 -0.7149 0 0.9983 0.1379 N N
exp55 0 0 0 0 1.9919 -0.8193 0 0.999 0.0804 N N
exp56 0 0.4314 0 0 1.2853 -0.5475 0 0.9975 0.2098 N Y
exp61 0 0 -0.1818 0 1.7119 0 0 0.9981 0.189 N N
exp62 0.9037 0 0 0 1.8094 -0.8813 0 0.998 0.196 N N
exp63 0 0 0 0 1.3038 0 -0.6962 0.9972 0.282 Y N
exp64 0.9764 0 0.1793 0 1.3818 0 -0.7954 0.9982 0.1789 N N
exp65 0.6059 0 0.4214 0 1.4628 0 -0.5534 0.9991 0.0901 N N
exp66 0.7244 0 0 0 1.3954 0 -0.3728 0.9992 0.0767 N N
exp71 0 0 0 0 2.9985 -2.6571 0 0.9209 10.3634 N N
exp72 1.0201 0 0 0 1.7136 -0.7347 0 0.9985 0.1659 Y N
exp73 0 0 0 0 1.5979 0 0 0.9824 1.9608 N N
exp74 0.7069 0 0 0.0517 2.0059 -1.303 0 0.9988 0.1321 N N
exp75 0 0 0 0 1.4831 -0.5172 0 0.998 0.2326 N N
exp76 0 0 0 0 1.4831 -0.5172 0 0.998 0.2326 N N
exp81 0 0 0 0 1.8571 0 0 0.9538 6.3663 N N
exp82 0 0 0 0 1.7091 0 0 0.9725 3.6825 N N
exp83 0 0 0 0 1.7311 0 0 0.9777 2.903 N N
exp84 0.4905 0.2501 0 0.0555 1.8692 -1.3119 0 0.9992 0.0993 Y N
exp85 0 0 0 0 1.8035 -0.4334 -0.2565 0.9993 0.0917 Y N
exp86 0 0.6426 0 0 1.6909 -1.6593 0.4216 0.9981 0.2508 Y N
Table A.2: Above is the result for estimating pe








h;t i + t for the
positive feedback treatment. The rst column shows the participant number. The second to
eights column shows the estimated coecients. We start from the largest possible model and
drop all the coecients that are not signicant at 5% level. The ninth and tenth columns
show the R2 and MSE of the regressions. The twelfth shows whether we reject the null
hypothesis of no breakpoint in the Chow test.
35Part.  p   value R squared MSE AC Chow
exp11 -0.3139 0.0000 0.9414 5.5581 Y N
exp12 -0.2974 0.0000 0.9447 4.8722 N Y
exp13 -0.4916 0.0000 0.9567 3.7767 N Y
exp14 -0.4161 0.0000 0.8040 14.7437 Y Y
exp15 -0.4248 0.0000 0.8942 8.9993 N Y
exp16 -0.2606 0.0000 0.9522 4.7818 N Y
exp21 -0.2618 0.0000 0.9380 5.4525 Y N
exp22 -0.4877 0.0000 0.9937 0.5489 Y N
exp23 -0.2057 0.0000 0.9731 2.3426 Y Y
exp24 -0.2962 0.0000 0.9796 1.8632 N Y
exp25 -0.6046 0.0000 0.8490 12.0504 Y N
exp26 0.0055 0.8252 0.9779 2.1271 Y N
exp31 -0.1867 0.0000 0.9710 2.7068 Y Y
exp32 -0.4345 0.0000 0.8884 8.5564 Y Y
exp33 -0.2399 0.0000 0.9851 1.3797 Y Y
exp34 -0.2872 0.0000 0.9971 0.2599 N Y
exp35 -0.4046 0.0000 0.8429 11.1724 Y N
exp36 -0.3318 0.0000 0.9473 5.1029 N Y
exp41 -0.0970 0.0466 0.8959 9.2903 Y N
exp42 -0.5674 0.0000 0.8625 11.5414 Y N
exp43 -0.1650 0.0337 0.7618 23.6035 Y N
exp44 -0.3157 0.0000 0.9316 5.9790 Y Y
exp45 -0.1842 0.0000 0.9498 4.6031 Y Y
exp46 -0.3004 0.0000 0.8967 8.3406 Y Y
exp51 -0.4105 0.0000 0.9234 6.3143 N Y
exp52 -0.3596 0.0000 0.9303 5.9393 Y Y
exp53 -0.7249 0.0000 0.8648 11.4676 Y N
exp54 -0.2939 0.0000 0.9212 7.0731 N Y
exp55 -0.3160 0.0000 0.9577 3.6575 Y Y
exp56 -0.3272 0.0000 0.8064 19.4969 N N
exp61 -0.4027 0.0000 0.8237 15.4160 Y N
exp62 -0.0004 0.9938 0.8785 14.2253 Y N
exp63 -0.0744 0.0594 0.9012 10.2230 Y N
exp64 0.0327 0.6024 0.8072 25.8189 N N
exp65 -0.5394 0.0000 0.5076 51.8923 N Y
exp66 -0.4915 0.0000 0.5940 30.6449 Y N
exp71 -0.2521 0.0000 0.9153 7.1180 N Y
exp72 -0.2285 0.0000 0.9332 5.6794 N Y
exp73 -0.2731 0.0000 0.9839 1.3788 N Y
exp74 -0.2395 0.0000 0.9685 2.6047 Y Y
exp75 -0.4561 0.0000 0.9866 1.2240 Y Y
exp76 -0.4632 0.0000 0.9029 7.5983 Y Y
exp81 -0.3677 0.0000 0.9548 4.0075 Y Y
exp82 -0.4979 0.0000 0.8721 9.8164 Y N
exp83 -0.1721 0.0000 0.9543 4.3523 N N
exp84 -0.1567 0.0000 0.9771 2.1902 Y Y
exp85 -0.3804 0.0000 0.9647 2.9116 Y N
exp86 -0.3396 0.0000 0.9664 2.7938 N Y
Table A.3: Above is the result of estimating pe
h;t = pt 1 + (pt 1   pt 2) (trend rule) for
the negative feedback treatment.The second and third column shows the estimated coe-
cients and associated p value. The fourth and fth columns show the R2 and MSE of the
regressions. The sixth and seventh shows whether the residual of the regression has serial
correlation within 10 lags, and we reject the null hypothesis of no breakpoint in the Chow
test.
36Part.  p   value R squared MSE AC Chow
exp11 0.7382 0.0000 0.9968 0.1507 N Y
exp12 0.7392 0.0000 0.9960 0.1835 Y Y
exp13 0.6958 0.0000 0.9979 0.1002 Y Y
exp14 0.8616 0.0000 0.9969 0.1430 Y Y
exp15 0.3908 0.0000 0.9962 0.1809 Y Y
exp16 0.6222 0.0000 0.9969 0.1399 Y Y
exp21 0.6801 0.0000 0.9939 0.0779 Y Y
exp22 -0.8371 0.2010 0.1562 36.6695 N N
exp23 0.4753 0.0000 0.9788 0.2571 Y Y
exp24 -0.4522 0.0000 0.9260 0.8429 Y Y
exp25 -0.0823 0.4719 0.8883 1.1204 Y Y
exp26 0.1501 0.0021 0.9813 0.2029 N Y
exp31 0.8568 0.0000 0.9981 0.1680 Y Y
exp32 0.9554 0.0000 0.9978 0.1859 Y N
exp33 0.8212 0.0000 0.9938 0.5325 N N
exp34 0.8932 0.0000 0.9981 0.1589 Y N
exp35 0.8957 0.0000 0.9986 0.1207 Y Y
exp36 0.7838 0.0000 0.9940 0.5239 N N
exp41 0.8698 0.0000 0.9982 0.1606 Y Y
exp42 0.9460 0.0000 0.9990 0.0841 Y Y
exp43 0.9623 0.0000 0.9981 0.1712 N N
exp44 0.5047 0.0000 0.9895 0.8690 N N
exp45 0.6695 0.0000 0.9941 0.5544 Y Y
exp46 0.8693 0.0000 0.9978 0.1970 Y Y
exp51 0.7203 0.0000 0.9987 0.1096 N N
exp52 0.3944 0.1220 0.9000 8.5280 N N
exp53 0.7358 0.0001 0.9396 4.6080 N N
exp54 0.9420 0.0000 0.9982 0.1435 N N
exp55 0.9244 0.0000 0.9989 0.0903 N N
exp56 0.6184 0.0000 0.9966 0.2738 N N
exp61 0.9531 0.0000 0.9974 0.2564 N N
exp62 0.8945 0.0000 0.9975 0.2394 N Y
exp63 0.7527 0.0000 0.9965 0.3420 N Y
exp64 0.9337 0.0000 0.9975 0.2426 N Y
exp65 0.7661 0.0000 0.9984 0.1620 Y N
exp66 0.8887 0.0000 0.9984 0.1607 N Y
exp71 0.8002 0.0005 0.9156 10.7493 N N
exp72 0.9020 0.0000 0.9978 0.2426 Y N
exp73 0.6954 0.0000 0.9811 2.0516 N N
exp74 0.9316 0.0000 0.9982 0.1938 Y N
exp75 0.7416 0.0000 0.9973 0.3007 N Y
exp76 0.7416 0.0000 0.9973 0.3007 N Y
exp81 0.6981 0.0000 0.9530 6.3286 N N
exp82 0.7556 0.0000 0.9715 3.7313 N N
exp83 0.6985 0.0000 0.9750 3.1934 N N
exp84 0.9352 0.0000 0.9983 0.2175 Y Y
exp85 0.9403 0.0000 0.9991 0.1130 N N
exp86 0.8256 0.0000 0.9968 0.4210 Y Y
Table A.4: Above is the result of estimating pe
h;t = pt 1 + (pt 1   pt 2) (trend rule) for
the positive feedback treatment.The second and third column shows the estimated coe-
cients and associated p value. The fourth and fth columns show the R2 and MSE of the
regressions. The sixth and seventh shows whether the residual of the regression has serial
correlation within 10 lags, and we reject the null hypothesis of no breakpoint in the Chow
test.
37Part.  p   value R squared MSE AC Chow
exp11 0.9424 0.0000 0.9861 0.6602 Y Y
exp12 1.1408 0.0000 0.9859 0.6492 Y N
exp13 1.5178 0.0000 0.9907 0.4352 Y Y
exp14 1.3952 0.0000 0.9841 0.7327 Y N
exp15 0.9251 0.0000 0.9916 0.3962 Y Y
exp16 0.5722 0.0000 0.9721 1.2868 Y Y
exp21 1.0935 0.0000 0.9498 0.6491 Y Y
exp22 1.0664 0.0000 0.1420 37.5080 N N
exp23 1.2244 0.0000 0.9614 0.4724 Y Y
exp24 0.7271 0.0000 0.9122 0.9999 Y N
exp25 0.7102 0.0000 0.7858 2.2849 N N
exp26 0.7515 0.0000 0.9626 0.4069 Y Y
exp31 0.8823 0.0000 0.9767 2.0097 Y Y
exp32 1.6048 0.0000 0.9734 2.2709 Y Y
exp33 1.0810 0.0000 0.9747 2.1736 Y Y
exp34 1.9355 0.0000 0.9789 1.7853 Y N
exp35 1.6927 0.0000 0.9779 1.8903 Y N
exp36 1.3980 0.0000 0.9782 1.8973 Y N
exp41 0.9779 0.0000 0.9817 1.6436 Y Y
exp42 0.9741 0.0000 0.9794 1.8161 Y N
exp43 0.8763 0.0000 0.9783 1.9282 Y N
exp44 1.0576 0.0000 0.9841 1.3211 Y N
exp45 1.0338 0.0000 0.9845 1.4542 Y Y
exp46 1.4682 0.0000 0.9830 1.5486 Y N
exp51 1.1025 0.0000 0.9841 1.2888 Y Y
exp52 0.8902 0.0000 0.8963 8.8466 N N
exp53 1.8644 0.0000 0.9351 4.9498 N N
exp54 1.3971 0.0000 0.9755 1.9568 Y N
exp55 1.4030 0.0000 0.9781 1.7679 Y N
exp56 1.0879 0.0000 0.9871 1.0317 Y Y
exp61 0.9198 0.0000 0.9751 2.4283 Y Y
exp62 1.6869 0.0000 0.9803 1.8727 Y N
exp63 1.8255 0.0000 0.9872 1.2446 Y Y
exp64 1.1373 0.0000 0.9776 2.2041 Y N
exp65 1.7368 0.0000 0.9876 1.2279 Y Y
exp66 1.5477 0.0000 0.9810 1.8593 Y N
exp71 0.9172 0.0000 0.8994 12.8476 N N
exp72 1.4850 0.0000 0.9739 2.8590 Y Y
exp73 1.1846 0.0000 0.9670 3.6002 Y N
exp74 0.9126 0.0000 0.9710 3.2125 Y Y
exp75 1.4159 0.0000 0.9837 1.8377 Y N
exp76 1.4159 0.0000 0.9837 1.8377 Y N
exp81 0.9753 0.0000 0.9406 8.1480 Y Y
exp82 0.9897 0.0000 0.9564 5.8048 Y N
exp83 1.0138 0.0000 0.9615 4.9608 Y N
exp84 0.6519 0.0000 0.9700 3.7406 Y Y
exp85 1.0167 0.0000 0.9727 3.5355 Y Y
exp86 1.1955 0.0000 0.9789 2.7769 Y N
Table A.5: Above is the result of estimating pe
h;t = pe
t 1 + w(pt 1   pe
t 1) (adaptive rule) for
the negative feedback treatment.The second and third column shows the estimated coe-
cients and associated p value. The fourth and fth columns show the R2 and MSE of the
regressions. The sixth and seventh shows whether the residual of the regression has serial
correlation within 10 lags, and we reject the null hypothesis of no breakpoint in the Chow
test.
38Part.  p   value R squared MSE AC Chow
exp11 0.6293 0.0000 0.9575 4.0606 N N
exp12 0.7760 0.0000 0.9282 6.3727 Y Y
exp13 0.5547 0.0000 0.9171 7.3071 Y Y
exp14 0.4525 0.0000 0.9106 6.9727 N Y
exp15 0.6980 0.0000 0.8539 12.7427 Y Y
exp16 0.7414 0.0000 0.9505 4.9973 N Y
exp21 0.6775 0.0000 0.9511 4.3043 N N
exp22 0.4953 0.0000 0.9664 2.9461 Y N
exp23 0.7426 0.0000 0.9832 1.4899 N Y
exp24 0.7894 0.0000 0.9556 4.1091 Y Y
exp25 0.3198 0.0000 0.8868 9.0512 N Y
exp26 0.9890 0.0000 0.9777 2.1630 Y N
exp31 0.8846 0.0000 0.9598 3.8891 Y Y
exp32 0.4645 0.0000 0.9431 4.4836 N Y
exp33 0.7463 0.0000 0.9867 1.2406 N Y
exp34 0.6691 0.0000 0.9945 0.4960 N Y
exp35 0.3911 0.0000 0.9426 4.0834 N Y
exp36 0.7070 0.0000 0.9347 6.5234 Y Y
exp41 0.8154 0.0000 0.9146 7.6203 Y Y
exp42 0.3493 0.0000 0.9141 7.2730 N N
exp43 0.7922 0.0000 0.7791 21.9006 N N
exp44 0.6362 0.0000 0.9425 5.0350 Y Y
exp45 0.7761 0.0000 0.9588 3.7798 N Y
exp46 0.6941 0.0000 0.9096 7.3088 N Y
exp51 0.5600 0.0000 0.8633 11.7131 Y N
exp52 0.6240 0.0000 0.9377 5.3217 Y Y
exp53 0.2863 0.0000 0.8933 9.0539 Y N
exp54 0.7174 0.0000 0.9142 7.7120 Y Y
exp55 0.6522 0.0000 0.9604 3.4285 Y Y
exp56 0.7583 0.0000 0.7791 22.2554 N N
exp61 0.5449 0.0000 0.8507 13.3092 Y N
exp62 0.9626 0.0000 0.8811 14.0468 N N
exp63 0.8725 0.0000 0.9116 9.2224 Y N
exp64 1.0217 0.0000 0.8077 25.9003 N N
exp65 0.5962 0.0000 0.4571 57.8418 N N
exp66 0.3470 0.0000 0.8561 10.8682 Y N
exp71 0.6960 0.0000 0.9306 5.9552 N Y
exp72 0.7421 0.0000 0.9402 5.2224 N Y
exp73 0.6880 0.0000 0.9887 0.9743 Y Y
exp74 0.7134 0.0000 0.9772 1.9062 N Y
exp75 0.5223 0.0000 0.9693 2.8093 Y N
exp76 0.3999 0.0000 0.9635 2.8652 Y Y
exp81 0.6569 0.0000 0.9312 6.1064 Y Y
exp82 0.4561 0.0000 0.9075 7.1060 N Y
exp83 0.8267 0.0000 0.9551 4.2800 N Y
exp84 0.8598 0.0000 0.9730 2.5944 Y Y
exp85 0.5453 0.0000 0.9825 1.4443 N N
exp86 0.6126 0.0000 0.9703 2.4757 Y Y
Table A.6: Above is the result of estimating pe
h;t = pe
t 1 + w(pt 1   pe
t 1) (adaptive rule)
for the positive feedback treatment. The second and third column shows the estimated
coecients and associated p value. The fourth and fth columns show the R2 and MSE
of the regressions. The sixth and seventh shows whether the residual of the regression has
serial correlation within 10 lags, and we reject the null hypothesis of no breakpoint in the
Chow test.
39